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Robert Anderson's pioneering exploration of martial law and censorship o 
comparative basis needs to be supplemented with the case of ethnically divi 
societies where the repression is mainly directed against ethnic outsiders. Of the 
case studies in this collection, Poland and Chile are culturally homogeneous soci 
while the plural states of India and Bangladesh are sufficiently integrated not to m 
one ethnic group alone the target of state action. 
Furthermore, the efficiency and sophistication of ideological social con 
depends not only on the literacy rate of the population but much more on the level 
industrialization. The need and pervasiveness of media manipulation correlates 
the country's rate of capital accumulation, standards of consumerism and role in 
global political economy. 
The two cases under consideration in this brief commentary, South Africa and Is 
rael, are obviously high on the scale of "modernization". Equally significant is the 
international importance for a variety of reasons. Their methods of political pol 
are therefore ambiguous on the democratic-military dimension of classification. 
que is their common ethnic dichotomy, the ideology of their ruling groups as chose 
but beleaguered people with a subsequent resolve to defend ethnically exclusive po 
and privileges. Both states are not colonial outposts, of alien settlers, as frequen 
portrayed, but sovereign entities, dependent to different degrees on outside economi 
support and international legitimacy. 
South Africa and Israel are democratic states in the self- definition of their ruler 
and in the political practice of the dominant sector. In the eyes of most 
blacks and Palestinians, however, their governments constitute illegiti 
In both states, the military and police exercise a pervasive influence on an essentially 
civilian government in an expanding executive state. The civilian-military distinction, 
however, becomes less important in those divided garrison states with widespread 
siege mentalities. Security considerations override civil liberties in a permanent state 
of emergency, whether formally declared, as in South Africa, or hidden behind "ad- 
ministrative detentions" and military administration, as on the West Bank and in Gaza 
since 1967. 
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Restrictions on the freedom of speech and censorship of the media reflect the so- 
cial and political dichotomy of ethnic states. Such polities explicitly understand them- 
selves as homes for one ethnic group only. The official symbols and identity of the 
state from the national anthem to monuments, rituals and official holidays exclude out- 
siders with a different religion or racial appearance. They are de facto, if not de jure, 
second-class citizens. Every Jewish person anywhere in the world can gain Israeli 
citizenship instantly upon emigration. No Palestinian who has been born in Israel but 
had been driven out during its turbulent history is allowed to return, regardless of h s  
or her political record. The 73 percent South Africans of African descent do not even 
possess voting rights for the central government. Hence, emergency legislation that in 
eory applies equally to all citizens has a different meaning for those who dominate 
and whom it tries to protect and those whom it is trying to control. Martial law is 
primarily directed against the discriminated, including their few allies within the 
dominant group. 
This ethnic dichotomy explains the paradox of a relatively free and active public 
discourse among the dominant section, particularly in Israel, but tight censorship ap- 
plied to the subordinate population. The ethnic state does not expect their consent but 
merely their acquiescence. Compliance without consent is all the rulers can achieve 
since the excluded, by definition, cannot identify with the ethnically different super- 
ordinates. Only a genuine deracialization in South Africa and secularization in Israel 
- the official recognition of a common society with equal individual rights- would 
make these states legitimate homes for all their citizens and remove the need to sup- 
press ideological resistance with censorship. 
In the meantime, tolerance for dissent among the rulers contrasts with repression 
of militant resistance by the dominated. However, there is more to the application of 
social control in South Africa and Israel. While generally aimed at depoliticising the 
subordinates, the authorities cannot prevent the information and politicisation of the 
d s d  by the very debates among the rulers how best tosuppress their challengers. After 
all, the underdogs can freely buy and read the papers of their overlords or switch 
television channels. Therefore, it must seem odd that the same picture or story can be 
published in a paper mainly read by dominant group members but is forbidden in an 
outlet aimed at the subordinates. The suppression of opposition organs catering main- 
ly for blacks or Palestinians aims above all at a symbol. It is not so much what they 
write but what they stand for that annoys the authorities. Against the official claim to 
control, the opposition voices symbolize defiance. 
The shrill propaganda of the alternative voices, however, proves hardly per- 
suasive. In any case, the stark reality often surpasses the stereotypical portrayal of 
atrocities.The subordinates do not need to read about their oppression in order to be 
conscienticized, as the missionary zeal of "peoples journalism" would like to claim. 
Thus, restrictions are not imposed out of fear of an unpleasant message that would 
sway wavering masses. Restrictions are mainly enacted because the rulers themselves 
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want to believe in their own illusions. The screaming headlines of official failure 
a thorn in the flesh of authoritarian omnipotence, The press of the oppressed dis 
the fantasy that the objects of administration are grateful for the official benev 
In the face of a hostile media, bought by thousands, the authorities can no longer c 
that the revolt is instigated by a few agitators. As has often been said, in order to 
press an unpleasant message, the messenger is being silenced. 
In South Africa, and even more so in Israel, official "news management" is eq 
ly concerned with the image of the country abroad. In particular, Israel's vulner 
lies in a changing perception of its "special status" which translates into heavy 
cia1 assistance from the diaspora. Therefore, restrictions of foreign correspond 
particularly TV crews, ranges high on the agenda of both Pretoria and Jerusalem 
the other hand, international legitimacy depends on being perceived as a democ 
state which forced both South Africa and Israel to make concessions under fore 
pressure. South Africa withdrew an impending law to license all journalists and so 
did not go ahead with a threatened ban of some opposition papers, such as thewee 
Mailor the left-radical journal Work in Progress. Both governments need the co 
tion of their domestic in-group opposition, in South Africa particularly the 
business community. This silent alliance in existential matters, such as thwarting san 
tions and guaranteeing economic growth, would be ruptured by too heavy-han 
measures against what is officially deemed "legitimate dissent". Emergency leg' 
tion, however, is ruthlessly applied against all organised attempts to affect the mor 
of the ruling group and find allies for the cause of the outsiders. South Africa, for 
ample, will tolerate criticism of Apartheid ideology or ridicule of government but n 
an "End Conscription Campaign" which mobilizes against compulsory military ser 
vice and makes common cause with the non-racial vision of the ANC and its internal 
offshoot, the United Democratic Front. 
Despite the outlined common features of the two ethnic states, the different goa 
of their differently situated outsiders correspond with different state strategies. In I 
rael, the Palestinians want out, in South Africa the blacks want in. In Israel only 
per cent of the labor force consists of Palestinians; the modem South African econo 
depends entirely on black labor and productivity. This imposes limits to ruthlessne 
on Pretoria, particularly in dealing with politicised black unions which do not exi 
the same extent among the much more stratifiedPalestinian society with an intact c 
munal economy and a strong middle class. 
The South African and the Israeli government apply opposing strategies to secure 
their continued dominance. Pretoria tries to enlarge its base of support by attempting 
to co-opt sections of its opposition on its terms. Israel systematically excludes its o p  
ponents by removing them from any political discourse. In tun, the strategies of the 
ANC and PLO are shaped by this state tactic: the ANC aims at preventing co-optation 
through boycotts and the politics of refusal ; the PLO, in contrast, must alter the world- 
wide stereotype of itself as anti-Jewish and savage terrorists . The uprising, in which 
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heavily armed soldiers shoot stone throwing youngsters, shrewdly reverted this image. 
Isael, which portrayed itself as always on the defence is now increasingly seen as the 
aggressor. Since Israel's financial support in the diaspora depends on the perception 
of a threat to Israel, the reversal of roles has touched its Achilles heel. 
Censorship and news manipulation aims at defining the ruling discourse in this 
contest. Hegemonic ideologies provide the conceptual master-frame for interpreting 
intense conflicts. Whose ideological definition will prevail at the end will determine 
the outcome of the competition, regardless of military might. That, in essence, repre- 
sents the ultimate victory of communication over naked force. An illegitimate regime 
is not necessarily an unstable one and prone to revolution. But the rising costs of in- 
creasing illegitimacy ultimately overwhelm authoritarian regimes, unless they liberal- 
ize well in advance. By censoring news about protests and grievances, authoritarian 
regimes fail to educate their own constituencies about the necessity of reform. 
Oblivious to their opponents, and increasingly intransigent through ignorance, 
authoritarian governments foster polarization. Thus, the short-term, successful repres- 
sion of an impending challenge contributes to the long-term downfall of undemocratic 
regimes. 
